Defense attorney Walls in the Carla Hughes trial points out quite rightly that the defense had no burden of proof in the case, even when the defense specifically accused someone else of the crime. The only time a defendant accepts a burden of proof is when he or she claims innocence by reason of insanity. Only then must a defendant prove anything: in that situation the defendant must prove insanity.

Mr. Walls made the remark in an on-camera interview with TruTV’s Jami Floyd. She asked him whether there really was evidence that Keyon Pittman (the cheating lover) actually did commit the crime and why the police did not charge him with it if there was.

Mr. Walls replied, in effect, that the jury may not have understood that the defense had no obligation to prove anything—including who really did commit the crime.

I feel certain that is exactly what happened. After all, the sole question the jury sent to the judge was whether or not the prosecution could have forced Ms. Hughes to testify. (I’ve already written that the question shows the jury did not understand basic tenets of the justice system in America.)

However, I have long suspected that pointing an accusing finger at a specific person is a big mistake, and now I understand why that is true.

• Psychologically, a juror is prepared to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, but, once another person is specifically named as a possible alternative culprit, the juror affords that new person the same benefit of doubt.

By accusing someone else, the defense unwittingly shifts the burden of proof to itself, no matter how many times the judge may admonish the jury against expecting a defendant to prove innocence.

I can’t recall a single case in which the defense pointed to a specific third party and subsequently prevailed with the jury. For example, O. J. Simpson’s “dream team” pointed to shadowy drug gangs as the more likely killer. They did not name a specific culprit.

But in the Raynella Dossett-Leath case, the defense specifically pointed to a rather unlikely person, the dead man’s daughter. The jury did not buy this—and in fact could not have bought it, since eventually the defense claimed the death was a suicide not homicide.

The rhetoric of a murder defense is crucial. Accusing a specific third party turns a defense into a prosecution.

Furthermore, the concept of reasonable doubt is incompatible with an affirmative, attack defense. How can a defense attorney say in the same breath, “I know who did it,” and “You should doubt the evidence presented in this case”?

In the end, I believe the Hughes jury had to conclude that the prosecution’s case was valid, since Ms. Hughes did not contradict several key pieces of evidence, most importantly that she possessed the murder weapon before and after the crime.

As for me, I don’t believe she is a murderer, but I also don’t know what really happened.