The Economist recently previewed the soon-to-be-published DSM-V, the manual of the American Psychological Association (APA) that guides expert psychological witnesses in criminal trials.

Wisely, the article is titled, “That Way Madness Lies.”  I say “wisely” because the new DSM-V is likely to lead judges and trial lawyers down the primrose path to Hell.

American law is already schizo when it comes to all things mental. Lawyers and judges are taught that motive is irrelevant to crime, but intent to commit a crime is. Worse yet, they’re also taught that the defendant’s “mental state” at the time of the crime is relevant.

The logic of ignoring motive is that a crime is a crime, regardless of why a person decides to commit the act. For example, if a person engages in civil disobedience (as Elaine Clermont did), she may do so for altruistic motives, but nonetheless she commits a crime.

The logic of proving intent is that accidents can happen, and when a person doesn’t intend to commit a crime, then he is innocent. Of course, a jury must examine the evidence of intent to commit a crime and find it lacking in such a case. When a driver hits a child running across the road and kills her, for example, the jury must decide whether this homicide was committed recklessly (willfully) or was an accident. The key here is that there must be some concrete evidence of intent either to be reckless or to kill. If the driver throws away empty liquor bottles before a squad car responds to the scene, the jury might reasonably conclude—since it’s illegal to have open liquor bottles in a moving vehicle—that he was willfully reckless.

But the logic of determining a defendant’s mental state at the time of a crime eludes me. I don’t see how anyone could do this, unless she was psychic.

Innocent by Reason of Insanity

Even before the publication of the first DSM in 1952, judges informed juries that certain mental states make it impossible for a defendant to form intent: among these are not only mental illness but also mental impairment (intoxication, temporary insanity, sleepwalking, “split personality”).

Since 1993, when the Supreme Court declared (in Daubert v Merrel) that only expert witnesses whose opinions are approved by peer review, all expert witnesses who testify about a defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime must rely on the APA’s most recent edition of the DSM for their diagnoses.

To the courts, it doesn’t seem to matter that the legal definition of insanity was devised in England in 1843 (the McNaughton Rule), while the peer-reviewed DSM no longer recognizes “insanity” as a mental state.

DSM-V Changes

According to the Economist’s review of the DSM-V, several changes in the APA’s approved opinions include: designation of degrees of illness (which I suppose they call degrees of severity of a disorder) and reclassification of many syndromes as personality disorders and declassification of others.

For example, one highly controversial issue is “transgender disorder.” Rumors are that the APA is going to decide whether transgenderism is a disorder or simply a condition, and in either case whether only children or only adults are to be considered “disordered” under these circumstances.

It seems to me, a non-lawyer, the issue can have an impact in court, for example, in cases such as 2009’s trial of Allen Andrade for murdering a transgender person, Angie Zapata.  In that case the victim was generally referred to as female. Her behavior—quite correctly—was deemed irrelevant: no one wants juries to blame a victim. But, in my opinion, the defense was prevented from fully exploring the issue of premeditation and the defendant’s mental state,  which was central to the prosecution. In fact, the state charged Andrade with a hate crime and first-degree, premeditated murder.

So, if the DSM-V classifies certain gender-identity conditions as disorders, it seems to me, either the defense or the prosecution (or both) in future such cases could potentially call expert witnesses to “prove” that a defendant’s mental state at the time of a violent confrontation with a sex partner is a form of temporary insanity.

For example, what if a transgender person became involved with a person she deemed to be of the opposite sex. The first time they had sex, her partner discovered that she had male genitalia. An argument ensued, during which the transgender person struck out violently and killed her partner. Would her lawyer be able to claim she suffered from a DSM-V-classified personality disorder, which caused her to strike out under the delusion she was defending herself against a larger, stronger man? Or even that she was hallucinating about her own body? Or could a defendant in a hate-crime case plead insanity on the basis of a diagnosis that he was paranoid schizophrenic about his own gender identity?

On the other hand, if the DSM-V classifies certain gender-identity conditions as not a disorder, the impact on civil litigation could be equally great: Does health insurance have to cover a condition the scientific community considers to be normal, if rare? In such a case wouldn’t treatment be considered merely cosmetic? And if the DSM-V classifies these conditions as a disorder, then is the proper health-care domain an operating room or a psychologist’s office? And, will a federalized health-care system make one or the other of these treatments mandatory (the cheaper option, no doubt)?

Delusions vs. Hallucinations

Even today under the DSM-IV regime, a defendant usually has to be hallucinating, not simply delusional, in order for a lay jury to understand that he or she is legally insane. The “fake Rockefeller,” for example, was unable to convince a jury that he actually believed he was a Rockefeller. He was clearly delusional, though. He clearly thought he had a right to kidnap his daughter.

According to the Economist, in addition the DSM-V will require psychologists to assign a severity classification to all mental disorders, whether they involve hallucinations or delusions. How will a jury be able to decide if the defense’s expert opinion is correct (that a defendant has the most severe form of a disorder) or the prosecution’s (that a defendant has a less severe form)?

Honestly, no jury is competent to decide between dueling experts.

Blind Them with Science

It’s time the Supreme Court recognized that “peer-reviewed science” isn’t the same thing as fact.

The legal definition of insanity also needs to be rewritten, and a judge, not a jury, should decide when a defendant is insane. It wouldn’t be that much different from other judicial responsibilities. After all, judges decide when an elderly person is incompetent and needs a guardian. Judges also decide when a defendant is competent to stand trial. If a defendant wishes to plead innocent by reason of insanity, a judge should hear the expert witnesses’ opinions and choose among them.

The only legal impediment to this sane approach is that no one is able to plead guilty to a capital offense. By pleading insanity, a defendant in effect is pleading guilty, even though denying responsibility. (I understand why: some people are so crazy they repeatedly plead guilty to other people’s crimes.)

But if we abolish the death penalty, the problem goes away. And if we permit defendants to plead guilty to crimes for which the penalty is life imprisonment without parole, then we spare the public the extreme expense of trying obviously guilty, serial criminals (as Kansas was spared a trial of the B-T-K Killer).